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RECONCILING ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
F. Michael Clelandt
Thank you very much, David, for your kind introduction. Although I am
not, in fact, an economist, I have a political science background and,
therefore, I think I can claim some authority to talk about the political
economy of energy and environment. As it turns out, this presentation will
recap much of what we heard yesterday; that was an accident, but perhaps a
fortunate one, given that I am last speaker on the program. What I will talk
about today is the energy-environment issue through the perspective of
energy.
The framework I will use is implicitly applicable to both Canada and the
U.S. We share the economic, environmental and energy space that we call
the northern half of North America. Much of the framework would probably
extend to Mexico, but we do not have quite the same degree of institutional
harmonization or similarity as we do between Canada and the U.S. Our
economies are deeply intertwined in energy, as well as with everything else
and although our energy economies are somewhat different and
complementary in several respects, for the most part, they share many key
similarities.
CONTINUING TRENDS IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Allow me to say a couple of things here that are probably self-evident to
most people in this room. Several people have mentioned, and I fully agree,
that economic growth can indeed be reconciled with environmental
improvement. I also think most people would agree that well-functioning
markets are consistent with the goal of improving the environment. Perhaps.
less self-evident, certainly in practice, is the need to look at the essential
characteristics of the energy system as a whole, to think how they are
intertwined, and to use that knowledge as a basis for deriving a more
effective environmental policy. I would argue that if you do not do that, you
will increase the degree of disharmony and arguably slow down the process
of environmental improvement.
t Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Canadian Electricity Association, Ottawa,
Ontario. B.A., University of British Columbia; M.P.L., Queen's University. Additional
biographical information available at page x.
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I have built my argument around several "snapshots" of key factors.
There are likely several that I have missed. For example, yesterday,
Professor Hickey mentioned a few very important international jurisdictional
issues, as well as the notion of the "full cycle" of the energy system. One
might usefully build these ideas into the set of snapshots.
Continuing, however, let me touch on what is perhaps another selfevident proposition. From time to time, people talk about the decoupling of
economic and energy use growth. However, as Mark Twain might have said,
the reports of that are greatly exaggerated; it may happen but it has not
happened yet and we are going to continue to need more energy for many
years to come.
Figure 1. World Energy Consumption and GDP, 1970-2000
World Energy Consumption and Gross Domestic Product, 1970 to 2000
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On the other hand, Figure 1 (which encompasses the global economy)
shows that, for about the last ten years, some divergence of those otherwise
parallel paths being driven primarily by what is happening in the OECD and
probably the former Soviet Union. This divergence is not yet being driven
by what is happening in the less-developed world, but still there has been
some divergence. In other words, the energy intensity of the economy in the
world is declining; that certainly is good news. The bad news is that it is not
declining anywhere near fast enough to meet the requirements of the Kyoto
Protocol.2
See James E. Hickey, Jr., The Environmental Implications of the Discovery and Delivery
of New Energy Resources in the Canada/U.S. Context, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 209, 209 (2002).
2 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
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For a decade or more, the environmental community has been pointing
out to us that we do not necessarily need oil or gas or any particular energy
commodity. However, you do need a way to get to work in the morning, a
warm house, and the lights on when you come home. Therefore, there are
many opportunities for substitution. You do not need the commodity; you
need what comes out at the end of the pipe. That is the good news. The bad
news is that there are some constraints on the substitutability of different
energy forms, commodities and technologies, depending on the service you
are actually trying to perform. David Jhirad put his finger on one of the most
challenging aspects yesterday when he talked about the problem of powering
mobility. 3 Motor fuels have some unique characteristics: essentially, power
density and portability. Unless you can meet those needs, you are not going
to find an environmentally-acceptable substitute for dealing with mobility
issues. The technologies are probably out there, but these problems create
particular challenges.
More bad news: the market is not helping us in terms of convincing
people to reduce their energy use. Most of us, when we see upward
perturbations in the price, tend to notice it briefly and get quite excited about
it. We may, very briefly, even reduce our energy use, as we have seen in
California for the last couple years.4 However, for the most part, we do not
see the price of the energy we use, and are thus not provided with a very
strong spur to increasing energy efficiency. That is not true of the industrial
sector, where energy is a relatively large part of production costs but it is true
for much of personal energy end use.
That said, as you can see in Figure 2 there is in Canada a well-established
trend of declining energy intensity in the economy. It is very much the same
picture in the United States. The line that starts down sooner is overall
energy usage; the other one is electricity. It is still not clear exactly where
those lines are going to go, but it appears that the two tendencies are
reasonably well entrained, and I think we will see their continuation. The
question is, particularly in the context of something like Kyoto, whether they
can be driven downward much more quickly. I would argue that the answer
is no, and I think that is one of the things you must take into account when
you ask yourself whether the speed of reductions implied in Kyoto is a
realistic objective.

U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.2, art. 3, 37 I.L.M. 32, 33-34 (1998).

3 See generally David J. Jhirad, An Energy Policyfor the 21st Century, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J.

315 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Jerry Hirsch, Lessons From the Energy Frontlines Utilities: Consumers
Adapted and Cut Demand, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at Cl, availableat 2001 WL 28924082
("Nearly half of the residential customers of the state's two largest utilities spent less on
electricity in August than in the same month a year earlier.").
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Figure 2.
Canadian Energy and Electricity Final Demand per GDP, 1975 to 1999
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Figure 3 shows the fuels mix in the economy going back to the about the
1870s (again, it is Canada I am looking at here, but I believe that the picture
in the US would be similar). Some interesting conclusions can be drawn
from it. One of things that is fascinating to me was how much wood
dominated the picture until the end of the 19th Century, then coal and oil.
Figure 3. Canadian Energy Demand by Primary Source, 1871-1997
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Canadian Energy Demand by Pimary Energy Source, 1871 -1997
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More recently, in the last 20 years, we have what we call a multi-fuel
economy or a multi-fuel and technology economy - a much more diversified
fuel and technology mix than we ever had prior to the 1980s. In all
probability, we will see that going forward and, for a variety of policy
reasons, that is a good thing. We have more choices - perhaps not more
choices at any given point in time (because you are hooked up to only one
source) - but more choices in terms of the evolution of technology.

Turning to technology, Figure 4 is taken from The Economist from an
article dealing with the process of technological change. Still, this chart
shows us some very interesting things. If you go back 150 or so years or so,
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many of the transformative technologies were energy technologies - water
power, steam, and then electricity at the beginning the last century, and then
the internal combustion engine. These technologies were transformative in
the sense that society was fundamentally transformed by their emergence.
Most observers would argue that we are not going to see another leap in
transformative energy technologies for a while, but, rather, incremental
changes, such as with fuel cells, wind power and photovoltaics or secondary
effects based on other technologies such as information technology. Perhaps
the most important point illustrated here is that that truly transformative
technological change comes in waves and that it emerges over periods of
several decades.
In other words, the fundamental transformation implied by the climate
change issue is something that will likely require several decades to bring
about. The International Energy Agency has done some interesting work
with respect to, for example, photovoltaics or biofuels, 5 but the horizons for
those energy sources are still two and three decades out before they become
integrated in the marketplace.
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND
CHALLENGES
Several core objectives - security and reliability, economic development,
environment and health - underlie energy policy. For the last ten years, the
focus in energy policy has been principally driven by considerations of the
environment and sustainable development. However, while the comparative
weight of each of the many objectives of energy policy changes with the
times, each one of them needs to be taken into account at all times.
Since the 1980s, we have discovered that most of these policy goals can
be realized by well-functioning private markets. However, markets, in and
of themselves, cannot adequately capture environmental externalities.
Nonetheless, the marketplace largely serves our needs for economic
development for affordable, reliable and secure energy. With that in mind,
we can turn to some of the challenges confronting energy policy and the
search for environmental sustainability.
Energy Market Restructuring: Some Considerations
Several challenges remain as we complete the move to a market
framework. David Drinkwater and David Manning both made those points

5 See generally Renewable Energy, at http://www.iea.org/techno/renew/Index.html (last

visited Aug. 6, 2002).
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eloquently when they talked about the respective situations in Ontario and
New York.6
Energy is not like any other commodity; people perceive it very
differently. It is still widely viewed as a public service, even though most
energy services are now provided by private-sector businesses working in
deregulated markets. As with health care (in Canada at least), most of the
public view energy as a right, and they react very strongly in the political
arena when they see that their "right" is being compromised by shortages,
perceived unfairness or (most especially) upward price perturbations (they
never notice downward price movements). Even well functioning energy
markets will have an inherent tendency to turbulence since the high natural
sensitivity of energy to the economic cycle combined with the very long lead
times for new production and technological change produces volatile shortterm price behaviour. Although there are ways to mitigate these effects,
there is still a long way to go, particularly with electricity, before we have
people reasonably comfortable with the idea of a market framework.
We also must consider the fact that energy systems rest on complex
physical networks which leaves at least part of the system with the
characteristics of a natural monopoly and therefore entails some limitation on
the effectiveness of competitive markets. The dependency on an extensive
infrastructure has other effects as well. Infrastructure-in-place will have a
large impact in determining options several decades from the time that
infrastructure was created. This reality is often at the root of any localversus-societal rights conflict; after all, the power line or the pipeline running
over your land is serving somebody else. As long as our energy systems rest
on physical infrastructure, we must consider this characteristic as we think
about balancing local versus societal effects and about timeframes for
implementing changes in the system.
As governments grapple with the questions of how they should proceed
with market restructuring, electricity creates special challenges. Electricity is
in a period of high turbulence as a consequence of its unique physical
attributes, its dependence on infrastructure, and its nature as an essential
underpinning to modern life all of which contributes to the lack of societal
consensus on the appropriate role of government. All of this is backdrop to
which we ignore at our peril as we think about managing related
environmental issues.

6

See David J. Manning, New Electricity: Generation, Pricing, Wheeling & Regulation,

28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 241 (2002); David W. Drinkwater, New Electricity: Generation, Pricing,
Wheeling & Regulation, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 267 (2002).
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Globalization of Energy Markets
From very local beginnings, energy markets are now operating on a very
large geographic scale. Oil and coal work in global markets, while gas works
largely in continental markets. Refined petroleum products work in very
large regional markets, and electricity increasingly works in very large (close
to continental-scale) regional markets.
The trend toward globalization of energy markets certainly affects the
way one must think about jurisdictional relationships. For many countries,
however, energy is still a matter of national security. While energy policy
continues to be seen in most countries as an underpinning to national
security, some other nations take it more for granted than as a highly salient
policy concern. In the U.S., especially, given recent events, energy security
is a mainstream political issue. I believe that the U.S. will continue to be
preoccupied with finding local or national sources of energy, and in the U.S.,
one of these is coal. Coal is going to be us for a long time, if for no other
reason than it is domestically available and low cost. Security will often
trump other issues and if environmental goals are not to be simply pushed
aside they need to be considered with the security imperative in mind.
The Environment
In the realm of energy production, the dominant public policy issue over
the past decade has been in respect to the environment. It is a complex story;
it is not just about Kyoto or about other air emissions, but also about the
effects of many different production technologies and fuels. Energy
production and use has an inherently large environmental footprint, causing
land, water or habitat disturbance, air emissions, visual and other aesthetic
impacts, and real and perceived public health effects. Some of the latter of
these may be misplaced but they are political realities. These concerns tend
to produce a very complex mix of trade offs not only between environment
and economy but also among environmental effects and between local and
societal requirements. Is this all a bad news story? I do not think so. I think
the evidence for the last several decades have been positive, notwithstanding
David Jhirad's comments yesterday that suggested that, on a world scale, we
have a rather large problem to deal with.7 I would say, in the North
American context, we have done reasonably well; we need to do better and
do more, but, so far, I think it has been working for us.
What are some ideas for how we can go forward? The point was made
yesterday and I think I have reinforced it, that one needs to keep an eye on
7 Jhirad, supra note 3, at 316-320.
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the other policy objectives. They cannot be compartmentalised; if you talk
only about energy and environment, without thinking about economic
development or the affordability of energy, or security, you will get the mix
wrong. Environmental policy that runs hard up against economic or national
security objectives will generate intense political conflict and the
environment will (likely) lose. I believe, however, they can be made to work
together.
SOME LONG TERM SOLUTIONS
One thing we can do to avoid this problem is to keep an eye on the longterm trends. I believe that wishful thinking that is contrary to those trends is
likely to founder because it will overstate the practical scope for energy
efficiency improvement, the limited potential for emerging technologies to
eliminate impacts, and the practicality of rapid technology take-up and
capital stock turnover. Many would say that is backward thinking; they
would argue that you can make leaps and disconnects. Indeed, external
shocks can create disconnects, as we saw in 1973 and 1979. 8 Sometimes,
you get technology disconnects, but I would not count on them. I would,
instead, count on a slow, steady push for improving energy efficiency,
moving new technologies into the marketplace, and turning over capital stock
in an efficient and expeditious way, as opposed to, for example, taking out a
lot of perfectly good capital stock to achieve short-term results.
We must also find ways to deal with the local-versus-global-effects issue.
Most everyone in the environmental community likes the idea of
interminable siting processes right up until the process affects projects that
are perceived as environmentally positive. I was at a conference a couple of
years ago on wind energy. We had very good discussions on the NIMBY
mindset as it affects wind projects. Someone at that conference suggested
that, perhaps, we need wind-friendly siting processes. I suggested in turn
that what we really need are friendly siting processes for all technologies,
and the silence in the room was deafening. I think the rule of law should
apply to everyone, and we should be looking at getting more stable and
predictable siting processes that are able to deal with the complex issue of
local rights versus societal rights. That should be obvious, but if you ever
want to talk about the political economy of energy and environment, this is it.
We need to be realistic about what consumers will or will not accept. In
North America at least, consumers are not keen on governments levying tax
increases as a way to make them absorb a larger part of the environmental
externality that they help create. We can make greater efforts to educate the
8 That is, the 1973 Oil Embargo and the 1979 Oil Crisis. See 25th Anniversary of the
1973 Oil Embargo, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/25opec/anniversary.htm (Mar. 7, 2000).
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public on the need to share some of the burden of achieving environmental
protection but this will take time and effort. In the meantime, I think it is
naive to believe that, in the near term at least, we can shove those costs down
consumer's throats. They will shove them right back on the politicians, and
the politicians know it.
We need to avoid policy shocks. If you try to force inflections in
underlying trends, you will likely get all sorts of unintended effects,
including increasing the tendency for market volatility and impairing the
movement to competitive markets. You could also end up with some
perverse environmental outcomes that you will need to fix later. In any
event, they probably will not work.
Finally, just to wrap it up, we should avoid short-term policy shifts to the
extent we can. Energy, including the new and desirable energy technologies
for the future, requires a more stable and predictable investment
environment. I would argue that public policy should create a more, rather
than less, stable environment to reduce rather than exacerbate risks.
Environment issues are long-term problems requiring long-term solutions.
We need to create the policy conditions needed to induce action now, but we
should not be fooled into thinking we are going to get the results in the near
term, as most of the results of our efforts will arrive in a time horizon that is
decades in the future.
Thank you very much.

